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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we describe our approach to achieve distributed differ-
ential privacy by sampling alone. Our mechanism works in the semi-
honest setting (honest-but-curious whereby aggregators attempt to
peek at the data though follow the protocol). We show that the utility
remains constant and does not degrade due to the variance as com-
pared to the randomized response mechanism. In addition, we show
smaller privacy leakage as compared to the randomized response
mechanism.
1 INTRODUCTION
Personal mobile information is being continuously collected and
analyzed with minimal regard to privacy. As we transition from small
mobile personal devices to large-scale sensor collecting self-driving
vehicles the needs of privacy increase.
The self-driving vehicle scenario becomes more difficult to pre-
serve both accuracy and privacy due to the smaller number of data
owners on the order of hundreds as opposed to large scale deploy-
ments of millions of data owners that learn only the heavy hitters
(top-k queries).
While many privacy definitions have been proposed, differential
privacy has emerged as the gold standard for privacy protection. Dif-
ferential privacy essentially states that whether or not a single data
owner decides to participate in data collection, the final aggregate
information will be perturbed only by a negligible amount. That is,
the aggregate information released gives no hints to the adversary
about a particular data owner. Techniques, such as the Laplace mech-
anism, add noise calibrated to the sensitivity of the query output [9],
though do not perturb which data owners actual participate. Thereby
making it difficult to privatize graphical structures such as social
networks where it is possible to inform data about a targeted data
owner from the targets friends alone.
Randomized response has been shown to be optimal in the local
privacy setting [6]. However, in order to preserve accuracy with the
randomized response mechanism, privacy must be sacrificed as the
data owners must respond truthfully too frequently. For example, a
data owner should respond truthfully more than 80% of the time to
have decent accuracy which greatly minimizes any privacy gains [16,
17]. The reason is due to the high variance from the coin tosses.
As more aggressive sampling is performed, the variance quickly
increases making it difficult to perform accurate estimation of the
underlying distribution.
As a result of the accuracy problem, there have been various
privacy-preserving systems which focus on the heavy-hitters only [4,
11]. These techniques ensure privacy only for large populations and
can only detect or estimate the most frequently occurring distribu-
tions, rather than smaller or less frequently occurring populations.
In this paper, we show how to achieve differential privacy in the
distributed setting by sampling alone. We evaluate the accuracy of
our privacy-preserving approach utilizing a vehicular crowdsourcing
scenario comprising of approximately 50,000 records. In this dataset,
each vehicle reports its location utilizing the California Transporta-
tion Dataset from magnetic pavement sensors (see Section §8.1).
2 RELATED WORK
Differential privacy [7–10] has been proposed as a mechanism to
privately share data such that anything that can be learned if a par-
ticular data owner is included in the database can also be learned if
the particular data owner is not included in the database. To achieve
this privacy guarantee, differential privacy mandates that only a sub-
linear number of queries have access to the database and that noise
proportional to the global sensitivity of the counting query is added
(independent of the number of data owners).
Distributional privacy [1] is a privacy mechanism which says
that the released aggregate information only reveals the underlying
ground truth distribution and nothing else. This protects individual
data owners and is strictly stronger than differential privacy. How-
ever, it is computationally inefficient though can work over a large
class of queries known as Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) dimension.
Zero-knowledge privacy [14] is a cryptographically influenced
privacy definition that is strictly stronger than differential privacy.
Crowd-blending privacy [13] is weaker than differential privacy;
however, with a pre-sampling step, satisfies both differential privacy
and zero-knowledge privacy. However, these mechanisms do not
add noise linear in the number of data owners and rely on aggressive
sampling, which negatively impact the accuracy estimations.
The randomized response based mechanisms [12, 15, 22, 23]
satisfies the differential privacy mechanism as well as stronger mech-
anisms such as zero-knowledge privacy. However, the accuracy of
the randomized response mechanism quickly degrades unless the
coin toss values are configured to large values (e.g., greater than
80%).
3 PRELIMINARIES
Differential Privacy. Differential privacy has become the gold stan-
dard privacy mechanism which ensures that the output of a sani-
tization mechanism does not violate the privacy of any individual
inputs.
Definition 3.1 ([7, 9]). (ε-Differential Privacy). A privacy mech-
anism San provides ε-differential privacy if, for all datasets D1 and
D2 differing on at most one record (i.e., the Hamming distance H is
HD1,D2 ≤ 1), and for all outputs O⊆ RangeSan:
sup
D1,D2
PrSanD1 ∈ O
PrSanD2 ∈ O ≤ expε (1)
That is, the probability that a privacy mechanism San produces
a given output is almost independent of the presence or absence of
any individual record in the dataset. The closer the distributions are
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(i.e., smaller ε), the stronger the privacy guarantees become and vice
versa.
Private Write. More generally, we assume some class of private
information storage [21] mechanisms are utilized by the data owner
to cryptographically protect their writes to cloud services.
4 MOTIVATION
Cryptographic blinding allows a service to compute a function with-
out the service learning the actual input or output. Thus, crypto-
graphic blinding provides private computation. More formally, a
client with value x encrypts their value Ex such that the service can
compute y = f Ex. The client then unblinds y to recover the actual
output. The client encryption can be as simple as generating a large
random value r and adding to the input x and then subtracting r from
y.
The randomized response mechanism can be viewed as perform-
ing a distributed blinding operation where the privacy is provided
by the estimation error that occurs when trying to estimate the dis-
tributed blinded value. More formally, let Y ES refer to the aggregate
count of the population that should truthfully respond “Yes" and
NO the population that should truthfully respond “No" and s is the
sampling probability.
Then the randomized response aggregate count is the following
Y ESs1 +Y ES +NOs2 = AGG. The Y ES +NOs2 is the distributed
blind value that then is estimated by simply calculating the expected
sampled value. The final Y ES value is estimated by subtracting the
expected value (of the blind) from the aggregate and then dividing
by the sampled probability used for the first part of the term.
It can be seen that the “distributed blinding" provides a notion
of privacy. However, the issue is that the estimation error increases
rapidly as the NO population increases due to the standard deviation
scaling with the population size.
The remainder of this paper we illustrate our approach which
decreases the estimation error and provides strong notions of privacy.
The crux of the approach is to provide the ability to remove the error
due to the variance by constructing a system of equations.
5 DISTRIBUTED DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
BY SAMPLING
First, we define the structure of a distributed sampling private mech-
anism. We then illustrate various mechanisms that satisfy distributed
sampling. Finally, we provide the mechanism for preserving accu-
racy in the distributed privacy model.
5.1 Structure
Our mechanism has multiple output value. For our purposes, we use
the notation of the Yes population as the ground truth and the re-
maining data owners are the No population. Each population should
blend with each other such that the aggregate information that is
released is unable to be used to increase the confidence or inference
of an adversary that is trying to determine the value of a specific
data owner.
Data owners are aggressively sampled (e.g., 5%). To overcome
the estimation error due to the large variance, the estimation of the
noisy “Yes" counts and sampled counts are combined to offset each
other and effectively cancel the noise, allowing for the aggressive
sampling.
5.2 Sampling
Sampling whereby a centralized aggregator randomly discards re-
sponses has been previously formulated as a mechanism to amplify
privacy [5, 13, 18–20]. The intuition is that when sampling approx-
imates the original aggregate information, an attacker is unable to
distinguish when sampling is performed and which data owners are
sampled. These privacy mechanisms range from sampling without
a sanitization mechanism, sampling to amplify a differentially pri-
vate mechanism, sampling that tolerates a bias, and even sampling a
weaker privacy notion such as k-anonymity to amplify the privacy
guarantees.
However, sampling alone has several issues. First, data owners
that answer “Yes" do not have the protection of strong plausible
deniability as they never respond “No" or are “forced“ to respond
“Yes" (e.g., via coin tosses). Data owners that answer “No" do not
provide privacy protection as they never answer “Yes". Second, as
we increase the sampling rate the variance will increase rapidly, thus
weakening accuracy. Finally, the privacy strength of the population
does not increase as the population increases. The Yes population is
fixed (e.g., those at a particular location) and we can only increase
the No population. The No population should also contribute noise
by answering “Yes" in order to strengthen privacy.
5.3 Sampling and Noise
We could leverage the No population by use the same sampling
rate though for the No population have a portion respond “Yes”. To
perform the final estimation we simply subtract the estimated added
noise.
Sampling and Noise Response. Each data owner privatizes their
actual value Value by performing the following Bernoulli trial. Let
πs be either the sampling probability for the Yes population as πsYes
or for the No population as πsNo .
Privatized Value =
{
⊥ with probability 1−πs
Value with probability πs
(2)
That is, a percentage of the Yes population responds “Yes" and a
percentage of the No population responds “Yes" (providing noise).
However, the Yes data owners do not answer “No" and also do
not have plausible deniability (that is being forced via coin toss to
respond “Yes").
5.4 Sampling and Plausible Deniability
We would like to have a percentage of each population respond
opposite of their actual value, provide plausible deniability, and have
outputs from the space of “Yes", “No", and ⊥ (not participating) in
order for the data owners to blend with each other.
To achieve plausible deniability via coin tosses we have a small
percentage of the “Yes" population be “forced" to respond “Yes".
The other output values follow from the sampling and noise scenario.
Privatized Value =

⊥ with probability 1−πsYes
1 with probability
πsYes ×π1 +1−π1×π2
0 otherwise
(3)
Privatized Value =

⊥ with probability 1−πsNo
1 with probability
πsNo ×1−π1×π2
0 otherwise
(4)
A benefit of plausible deniability is that the estimation of the
population will provides privacy protection via noise. However, it
is difficult to estimate the underlying ground truth due to the added
noise. We desire better calibration over the privacy mechanism.
5.5 Mechanism
The output mechanism has multiple output values. A fraction of each
of the Yes and No population should be included. Each population
should have some notion of plausible deniability. The total number
of data owners DO can be computed by summing the total number
of “Yes", “No", and ⊥ responses. It should be noted that if the
data owners would not write ⊥ it would be difficult to estimate and
calculate the underlying Yes count.
Definition 5.1. (Minimal Variance Parameters) We model the sum
of independent Bernoulli trials that are not identically distributed,
as the poisson binomial distribution (we combine “No" and ⊥ into
the same output space for modeling purposes). Let Yes′ represent
those that respond “Yes", regardless if they are from the Yes or No
population.
The success probabilities are due to the contributions from the
Yes and No populations. We then sum and search for the minimum
variance.
Utility is maximized when:
minVarP“Yes”|Yes+VarP“Yes”|No (5)
There are a couple observations. The first is that uniform sampling
across both populations (Yes and No) limits the ability to achieve
optimal variance. As we increase the No population by increasing the
queries and the number of data owners that participate, the variance
will correspondingly increase. For example, 10% sampling will
incur a large variance for a population of one million data owners.
To address this, the sampling parameters should be separately tuned
for each population. We desire a small amount of data owners to
be sampled from the Yes population to protect privacy and an even
smaller amount from the No population (as this population will be
large and only a small amount is required for linear noise). The
other observation is that for the plausible deniability, by fixing the
probabilities the same across the Yes and No population also restricts
the variance that can be achieved.
Thus, the optimal distributed sampling mechanism is one that
tunes both populations.
Mechanism. Let πs be either the sampling probability for the Yes
population as πsYes or for the No population as πsNo . Let πp be either
the plausible deniability parameter for the Yes population as π1 or the
No population π2 respectively. The mechanism that we use which
satisfies distributed sampling is as follows:
Privatized Value =

⊥ with probability
1−πsYes1 +πsYes2
1 with probability πsYes1 ×π1
1 with probability πsYes2 ×π2
0 with probability
πsYes1 ×1−π1+
πsYes2 ×1−π2
(6)
Privatized Value =

⊥ with probability 1−πsNo
1 with probability
πsNo ×π3
0 otherwise
(7)
It should be noted that πsYes1 × π1 are the percentage of data
owners that answer truthfully “Yes" and πsYes2 ×π2 are the percentage
of data owners that are “forced" to respond “Yes" providing the
plausible deniability. Each case has its own coin toss parameters in
order to be able to fine tune the variance and reduce the estimation
error as opposed to the prior examples where the variance cascades
across terms adding error.
6 ACCURACY
6.1 First Attempt Cancelling the Noise
Let DO be the total number of data owners. Let Y ES and NO be the
population count of those that truthfully respond “Yes" and “No"
respectively such that Y ES+NO = DO.
LEMMA 6.1. (Yes Estimate From Aggregated Count)
Expected value of “Yes" responses is:
E“Yes” = πYes1 ×π1×YES+
πYes2 ×π2×YES+
πNo×π3×DO−YES
(10)
Solving for Y ES results in:
YES =
E“Yes”−πNo×π3×DO
πYes1 ×π1 +πYes2 ×π2−πNo×π3
(11)
The estimator ˆYESYes accounting for the standard deviation σ“Yes”
is:
ˆYESYes =
E“Yes”±σ“Yes”−πNo×π3×DO
πYes1 ×π1 +πYes2 ×π2−πNo×π3
(12)
LEMMA 6.2. Standard Deviation of the Aggregated “Yes" Count
The standard deviation σ“Yes” is:
Var“Yes” = πYes1 ×π1 +πYes2 ×π2×
1−πYes1 ×π1 +πYes2 ×π2×
YES+
πNo×π3×
1−πNo×π3×
NO
(13)
σ“Yes” =
√
Var“Yes” (14)
LEMMA 6.3. (Yes Estimate From Aggregated “No" Count)
Expected value of “Yes" responses is:
E“Yes” = πYes1 ×1−π1×YES+
πYes2 ×1−π2×YES+
πNo×1−π3×DO−YES
(15)
Solving for Y ES results in:
YES =
E“Yes”−πNo×1−π3×DO
πYes1 ×1−π1 +πYes2 ×1−π2−πNo×1−π3
(16)
The estimator ˆYESNo accounting for the standard deviation σ“No”
is:
ˆYESNo =
E“Yes”±σ“Yes”−πNo×1−π3×DO
πYes1 ×1−π1 +πYes2 ×1−π2−πNo×1−π3
(17)
LEMMA 6.4. Standard Deviation of the Aggregated “No" Count
The standard deviation σ“No” is:
Var“Yes” = πYes1 ×1−π1 +πYes2 ×1−π2×
1−πYes1 ×1−π1 +πYes2 ×1−π2×
YES+
πNo×1−π3×
1−πNo×1−π3×
NO
(18)
σ“No” =
√
Var“No” (19)
LEMMA 6.5. (Yes Estimate From Sampled Population)
Expected value of ⊥ (not participating) responses is:
E⊥ = 1−πYes1 +πYes2 ×YES+
1−πNo×DO−YES (20)
Solving for Y ES results in:
YES =
E⊥−1−πNo×DO
1−πYes1 +πYes2 −1−πNo
(21)
The estimator ˆYES⊥ accounting for the standard deviation σ⊥
is:
ˆYES⊥ =
E⊥±σ⊥−1−πNo×DO
1−πYes1 +πYes2 −1−πNo
(22)
LEMMA 6.6. Standard Deviation of the Sampled Population
The standard deviation σ⊥ is:
Var⊥ = 1−πYes1 +πYes2×
πYes1 +πYes2×
YES+
1−πNo×
πNo×
NO
(23)
σ⊥ =
√
Var⊥ (24)
LEMMA 6.7. Solving for Y ES
There are two approaches we can take. We can either use the
“Yes" estimators to estimate the underlying population as described
earlier. Or we can treat the equations as a system of linear equations.
The observation is that setting π1 = π2 = π3 = 1 results in the
standard deviation being equal for σ“Yes”, σ“No”, and σ⊥. This
has the effect of resulting in no “No" responses and the two equations
are thus dependant.
We have the following system of linear equations of two unknown
variables Y ES and σ as follows:
E“Yes”±σ = Observed“Yes” (25)
E⊥±σ = Observed⊥ (26)
E“Yes”±σ +E⊥±σ = DO (27)
We then solve for Y ES and σ for each combination of varying ±
signs using a solver. We eliminate the solutions which assign Y ES a
negative value.
It would be nice if we could cancel out the error. It would also be
nice if the system of linear equations above would have exactly one
solution. However, it’s not clear that we can immediately guarantee
this.
6.2 Reducing the Error
As we control the randomization, can we construct a mechanism
whereby the error introduced by the NO population cancels out?
Performing uniform sampling across both Y ES and NO populations
allows us to cancel the population error though we are not able to
precisely estimate the Y ES population as it also cancels out the Y ES
terms.
One observation is that the error terms potentially could cancel
out if the signs were flipped. Thus, we construct our mechanism as
follows. Each data owner responds twice for the same query, though
slightly flips a single term to allow for the error cancelation.
A Privatized Value =

⊥1 with probability π⊥1
⊥1 with probability πs
⊥2 with probability π⊥2
⊥3 with probability
1−π⊥1 −π⊥2 −πs
(28)
B Privatized Value =

⊥1 with probability π⊥1
⊥2 with probability πs
⊥2 with probability π⊥2
⊥3 with probability
1−π⊥1 −π⊥2 −πs
(29)
YESC Privatized Value =

⊥1 with probability π⊥1
⊥2 with probability πs
⊥2 with probability π⊥2
⊥3 with probability
1−π⊥1 −π⊥2 −πs
(30)
NOC Privatized Value =

⊥1 with probability π⊥1
⊥3 with probability πs
⊥2 with probability π⊥2
⊥3 with probability
1−π⊥1 −π⊥2 −πs
(31)
The expected values are as follows.
The first set expected values are:
E⊥1A = π⊥1 ×TOTAL+πs×TOTAL
E⊥2A = π⊥2 ×TOTAL
E⊥3A = π⊥3 ×TOTAL
(32)
The second set expected values are:
E⊥1B = π⊥1 ×TOTAL
E⊥2B = π⊥2 ×TOTAL+πs×TOTAL
E⊥3B = π⊥3 ×TOTAL
(33)
The third set expected values are:
E⊥1C = π⊥1 ×TOTAL
E⊥2C = π⊥2 ×TOTAL+πs×YES
E⊥3C = π⊥3 ×TOTAL+πs×NO
(34)
To solve for the YES population as follows:
YES =
E⊥2C −E⊥2A
πs
(35)
6.3 Multiple Values
We now examine how to privatize for multiple for multiple values.
We can achieve this in two rounds. Say there are V possible output
values (e.g., V possible location IDs). Let V ′ be the truthful output
value.
Round One =

⊥0 with probability π⊥0
⊥0 with probability πs
⊥1 with probability π⊥1
⊥2 with probability π⊥2
...
⊥V with probability
1−π⊥0 −π⊥1 − ...−π⊥V −πs
(36)
Yes Round Two =

⊥0 with probability π⊥0
⊥1 with probability π⊥1
⊥2 with probability π⊥2
...
⊥V ′ with probability πv′
⊥V ′ with probability πs
...
⊥V with probability
1−π⊥0 −π⊥1 − ...−π⊥V −πs
(37)
No Round Two =

⊥0 with probability π⊥0
⊥0 with probability πs
⊥1 with probability π⊥1
⊥2 with probability π⊥2
...
⊥V with probability
1−π⊥0 −π⊥1 − ...−π⊥V −πs
(38)
The expected values are as follows.
The first round of expected values are:
E⊥00 = π⊥0 ×TOTAL+πs×TOTAL
E⊥10 = π⊥1 ×TOTAL
E⊥20 = π⊥2 ×TOTAL
...
E⊥V0 = π⊥V ×TOTAL
(39)
The second round of expected values are:
E⊥01 = π⊥0 ×TOTAL
E⊥11 = π⊥1 ×TOTAL
E⊥21 = π⊥2 ×TOTAL
...
E⊥V ′1 = π⊥V ′ ×TOTAL+πs×TOTAL
...
E⊥V1 = π⊥V ×TOTAL
(40)
To solve for the YES population as follows:
YES =
E⊥V ′1 −E⊥V ′0
πs
(41)
7 PRIVACY GUARANTEE
7.1 Differential Privacy Guarantee
DDPS satisfies differential privacy. Let “Yes” be the privatized re-
sponse and Yes and No be the respective populations.
εDP = max
(
ln
(Prπ⊥2 |Y ES
Prπ⊥2 |NO
)
, ln
( Prπ⊥3 |NO
Prπ⊥3 |Y ES
))
(42)
Prπ⊥2 |Y ES
Prπ⊥2 |NO
=
π⊥2 +πs
π⊥2
(43)
Prπ⊥3 |NO
Prπ⊥3 |Y ES
=
π⊥3 +πs
π⊥3
(44)
εDP = max
(π⊥2 +πs
π⊥2
,
π⊥3 +πs
π⊥3
)
(45)
8 EVALUATION
8.1 Accuracy
We evaluate the Distributed Differential Privacy By Sampling (DDPS)
mechanism over a real dataset rather than arbitrary distributions. We
utilize the California Transportation Dataset from magnetic pave-
ment sensors [2] collected in LA\Ventura California freeways [3].
There are a total of 3,220 stations and 47,719 vehicles total. We
assign virtual identities to each vehicle. Each vehicle announces the
station it is currently at.
Figure 1 compares the DDPS mechanism to the ground truth data
over a 24 hour time period with a confidence interval of 99%. We
select a single popular highway station that collects and aggregates
vehicle counts every 30 seconds. (For reasons of illustration we
graph a subset of points for readability). We assign virtual identifiers
and have every vehicle at the monitored station truthfully report
“Yes" while every other vehicle in the population truthfully reports
“No". The DDPS mechanism then privatizes each vehicle’s response.
Traffic management analyzing the privatized time series would be
able to infer the ebbs and flow of the vehicular traffic.
The coin toss probabilities are fixed and the sampling No rate is
adjusted for privacy and error guarantees. The parameters πsYes1 =
0.45, πsYes2 = 0.50, π1 = 0.95, π2 = 0.98, π3 = 0.98 are fixed and
πsNo = 0.068 varies from 0.068 to 0.00000068.
8.2 Privacy
We evaluate privacy strength of the DDPS mechanism by examining
the crowd sizes. We use the binomial complementary cumulative
distribution function (ccdf) to determine the threshold of the num-
ber of successes. The crowd blending size is controlled by the No
population, that is the number of data owners that truthfully respond
“No". Also, the data owner blends in the ⊥ crowd, that is the crowd
which is not participating.
The number of crowds an single owner blends is determined by
the number of queries (e.g., number of crowdsourced locations). The
coin toss probability of (πsNo ×π3) magnifies the number of crowds,
that is the number of queries that the data owner will respond to.
Also, the data owner blends in the ⊥ crowd.
Table 1 shows the number of additional locations a single data
owner will respond to out of 3,320. Decreasing the sampling rate
causes a reduction in the number of additional locations. In this case,
Locations TossThree(π3) SamplingRate(πsNo) Number Stations
1 0.98 0.05 3320
3 0.98 0.00025 83,000
3 0.98 0.000025 830,000
Table 1: Multiple Locations. A single data owner will claim to
be in multiple locations simultaneously.
CrowdSize TossThree(π3) SamplingRate(πsNo) Population
160 0.98 0.05 48,719
140 0.98 0.00025 1,047,719
130 0.98 0.000025 10,047,719
Table 2: Crowd size. A single data owner blends with k other
data owners who noisily answer “Yes" from the No population
.
the mechanism essentially ignores the data owner as the aggregate
output information is essentially the same output distribution as show
by the graph. As each data owner reports they are at their actual
location less than 5% of the time, the additional three simultaneous
announcements provides adequate privacy protection.
Table 2 shows the number of data owners an individual will
blend with. We vary the population of additional data owners and
accordingly decrease the sampling rate πNo to calibrate the error.
The noise added is linear with the number of data owners to protect.
Sampling reduces the the crowd size yet at the same time provides
privacy protection.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we show how to achieve differential privacy in the
distributed setting by sampling alone. We show that we can maintain
constant error (i.e., absolute error) even as the population increases
and achieve lower privacy leakage as compared to randomized re-
sponse.
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Figure 2: Privacy Leakage. Differential Privacy ε leakage.
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Figure 3: Privacy Leakage. Differential Privacy ε leakage.
